Corzine May Skate in MF Global Swindle

Kurt Nimmo | Infowars
November 23 2011

It is not certain if John S. Corzine will ever do the perp walk – or even be compelled to answer questions – for his role in the disappearance of over a billion dollars in the MF Global swindle.

The House Financial Services Committee, however, has started a laborious investigation process, no matter how timidly. It has asked Corzine to testify about the collapse of MF Global and the whereabouts of hundreds of millions of dollars in customer money that mysteriously went missing.

It should be noted that Corzine will not be compelled to answer questions or even respond to the request by the House Financial Services Committee. If push comes to shove, the committee has the power to subpoena Corzine and his underling, Bradley Abelow, the firm’s chief operating officer. It has yet to say one way or the other if it intends to do this.

The FBI and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are now involved finding out what happened. An investigation may take months – long enough for the scandal to fall out of view so it can be swept conveniently under the rug.

It looks like Corzine may avoid accounting for the money or facing responsibility for its disappearance. Instead, blame may be shifted around and lawmakers will spank the regulatory agencies supposedly overseeing the industry.

Corzine is Goldman Sachs alumni and as everybody knows Goldies are above the law.

  • Congressional Panel Seeks to Question Corzine (colonel6.com)
  • Congressional Panel Seeks to Question Corzine (dealbook.nytimes.com)
  • Jon Corzine called to Congress to account for MF Global’s collapse (guardian.co.uk)

Ann Barnhardt ~ A Broker With Integrity Closes Her Hedge Brokerage Firm

Ann Barnhardt | Barnhardt Capital Management Inc.
November 17 2011

BCM Has Ceased Operations

Dear Clients, Industry Colleagues and Friends of Barnhardt Capital Management,

It is with regret and unflinching moral certainty that I announce that Barnhardt Capital Management has ceased operations. After six years of operating as an independent introducing brokerage, and eight years of employment as a broker before that, I found myself, this morning, for the first time since I was 20 years old, watching the futures and options markets open not as a participant, but as a mere spectator.

The reason for my decision to pull the plug was excruciatingly simple: I could no longer tell my clients that their monies and positions were safe in the futures and options markets – because they are not. And this goes not just for my clients, but for every futures and options account in the United States. The entire system has been utterly destroyed by the MF Global collapse. Given this sad reality, I could not in good conscience take one more step as a commodity broker, soliciting trades that I knew were unsafe or holding funds that I knew to be in jeopardy.

The futures markets are very highly-leveraged and thus require an exceptionally firm base upon which to function. That base was the sacrosanct segregation of customer funds from clearing firm capital, with additional emergency financial backing provided by the exchanges themselves. Up until a few weeks ago, that base existed, and had worked flawlessly. Firms came and went, with some imploding in spectacular fashion. Whenever a firm failure happened, the customer funds were intact and the exchanges would step in to backstop everything and keep customers 100% liquid – even as their clearing firm collapsed and was quickly replaced by another firm within the system.

Everything changed just a few short weeks ago. A firm, led by a crony of the Obama regime, stole all of the non-margined cash held by customers of his firm. Let’s not sugar-coat this or make this crime seem “complex” and “abstract” by drowning ourselves in six-dollar words and uber-technical jargon. Jon Corzine STOLE the customer cash at MF Global. Knowing Jon Corzine, and knowing the abject lawlessness and contempt for humanity of the Marxist Obama regime and its cronies, this is not really a surprise. What was a surprise was the reaction of the exchanges and regulators. Their reaction has been to take a bad situation and make it orders of magnitude worse. Specifically, they froze customers out of their accounts WHILE THE MARKETS CONTINUED TO TRADE, refusing to even allow them to liquidate. This is unfathomable. The risk exposure precedent that has been set is completely intolerable and has destroyed the entire industry paradigm. No informed person can continue to engage these markets, and no moral person can continue to broker or facilitate customer engagement in what is now a massive game of Russian Roulette.

I have learned over the last week that MF Global is almost certainly the mere tip of the iceberg. There is massive industry-wide exposure to European sovereign junk debt. While other firms may not be as heavily leveraged as Corzine had MFG leveraged, and it is now thought that MFG’s leverage may have been in excess of 100:1, they are still suicidally leveraged and will likely stand massive, unmeetable collateral calls in the coming days and weeks as Europe inevitably collapses. I now suspect that the reason the Chicago Mercantile Exchange did not immediately step in to backstop the MFG implosion was because they knew and know that if they backstopped MFG, they would then be expected to backstop all of the other firms in the system when the failures began to cascade – and there simply isn’t that much money in the entire system. In short, the problem is a SYSTEMIC problem, not merely isolated to one firm.

Perhaps the most ominous dynamic that I have yet heard of in regards to this mess is that of the risk of potential CLAWBACK actions. For those who do not know, “clawback” is the process by which a bankruptcy trustee is legally permitted to re-seize assets that left a bankrupt entity in the time period immediately preceding the entity’s collapse. So, using the MF Global customers as an example, any funds that were withdrawn from MFG accounts in the run-up to the collapse, either because of suspicions the customer may have had about MFG from, say, watching the company’s bond yields rise sharply, or from purely organic day-to-day withdrawls, the bankruptcy trustee COULD initiate action to “clawback” those funds. As a hedge broker, this makes my blood run cold. Generally, as the markets move in favor of a hedge position and equity builds in a client’s account, that excess equity is sent back to the customer who then uses that equity to offset cash market transactions OR to pay down a revolving line of credit. Even the possibility that a customer could be penalized and additionally raped AGAIN via a clawback action after already having their customer funds stolen is simply villainous. While there has been no open indication of clawback actions being initiated by the MF Global trustee, I have been told that it is a possibility.

Continue reading

Gerald Celente – MF Global “Took my Money”

CelenteDominique de Kevelioc de Bailleul – Trends Research Institute founder and director, Gerald Celente, told Russia Today (RT) in a Nov. 14 interview that the fall of MF Global took his futures account down with it. Celente cannot access his account nor get answers to his inquiries from representatives of Lind-Waldock, the firm with whom he opened an account.

“They took my money; they took out of my account . . . it wasn’t being traded by anyone . . . this is like having money in a bank account,” Celente forcefully said. “They took my money out of my account, six figures, and they have it. They closed out two of my positions, and I cannot get any answers, and I can’t get my money.” Continue reading

Corzine’s Downfall

by Nick Paumgarten | The New Yorker
November 4 2011

The collapse this week of the broker-dealer MF Global and the comeuppance of its chief executive Jon Corzine, who resigned Friday, have been and will be put to many political and rhetorical purposes. MF Global’s bankruptcy has been called, possibly, the first domino in a potential collapse of the European banking system; in this rendering, it’s a rough analog to the failure, in the spring of 2008, of Bear Stearns, which presaged the mayhem of autumn. It might well be cast as a catalyst for more government regulation, or smarter regulation; to some, it might even be a case study in overregulation. (Every rationale for regulation seems to contain, as yang to its yin, an argument that regulation is actually to blame.)

Corzine’s downfall is an update on Icarus, an illustration of hubris. It reminds us that leverage kills, that it is dangerous to pick up nickels in front of a steamroller, that risk is risky, that pigs get fat while hogs get slaughtered. It complicates the Democrats’ hopes of harnessing anti-Wall Street fervor in the Presidential election, because Corzine has been one of Barack Obama’s most generous supporters—a possible future Treasury Secretary. The Republicans will not soon let this one go. It certainly further tarnishes the reputation of Goldman Sachs.

Corzine, a former C.E.O. of Goldman, took over a company partially owned by the firm of another ex-Goldmanite, Christopher Flowers, and managed, in a year and a half, to destroy it, in part while resisting oversight from a government regulator (the Commodity Futures Trading Commission) whose chairman, Gary Gensler, is also an Goldman alumnus. It further damages the perception, or myth, that a becoming a partner at Goldman Sachs bespeaks brilliance, or insures success or a lifetime inclusion in the vampiresquidspiracy (although you can find whisperings of a conspiracy theory that Goldman planted Corzine at MF Global in order to destroy it—a notion that is almost as beguiling as it is ludicrous). A report, in the Times, had Flowers showing up at the doomed eleventh-hour save-this-firm discussions in “mismatched shoes”—picture a loafer on one foot, and a white beaded moccasin on the other, a Wall Street gloss on Vinny (the Chin) Gigante wandering around Mott Street in bathrobe and slippers.

Corzine’s collapse is also an occasion for schadenfreude, not only for those among Occupy Wall Street’s 99 per cent, who’d be ready to pitchfork him to pieces just because, but also for the tiny cowering minority, who may resent Goldman for its perceived arrogance or cunning, or who may question the narcissistic folly/civic harm of Corzine’s spending over a hundred million of his own money to get elected to public office. The sentiment, among his peers, was that Corzine wasn’t so great a trader to begin with, and that in the years since he’d left Goldman, his skills, such as they were, had got rusty or outdated. (“I am loving every minute of this,” a hedge fund manager said in an e-mail.)

Continue reading at New Yorker